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Summary findings
Argentina has been a leader among developing countries  supervision combined with privatization. The provincial
in restructuring its banking sector. Clarke and Cull  banks that remained in the public sector did not
analyze the performance of those banks before and after  demonstrate the same performance gains as privatized
privatization and estimate fiscal savings associated with  provincial banks. The decision to maintain a public
privatizing Argentina's banks rather than keeping them  provincial bank is a costly one.
public and later recapitalizing them.  Policymakers should expect privatization to pass
The authors describe the process of privatization,  through some or all of the following steps:
including the creation of residual entities for the assets  *  With respect to preprivatization audits, expect losses
and liabilities of public provincial banks that private  hidden in these banks to be larger than those indicated in
buyers found unattractive and the creation of a special  prior audits.
fund (the Fondo Fiduciario) to convert the short-term  *  If residual entities are created, expect them to hold a
liabilities of the residual entities into longer-term  large share of the assets and liabilities of the old public
obligations.  provincial bank, if the quality of its loan portfolio was
They argue that the Fondo, created through  low.
cooperation between the Argentine federal government  *  Do not expect the price paid for the privatized
and the World Bank, was key in making privatization of  entity (the so-called good bank) to be great, at least
the banks politically feasible. Argentina privatized  compared with assets and liabilities in the residual entity.
roughly half of its public provincial banks.  *  If the residual entity is large, the province will be
The Argentine experience suggests that bank  confronted  with substantial short-term liabilities. But
privatization may succeed only when accompanied by a  with assistance and an aggressive asset recovery strategy,
sound, incentive-compatible system of prudential  governments should be able to navigate their way
regulation. The regulatory environment affects a bank's  through short-term difficulty.
solvency.  * The costs of privatization are less than the costs of
Improved regulation and supervision alone does not  future recapitalization, even if the near-term
deliver the same benefits as improved regulation and  management of the residual entity does not go well.
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B1ankers'  incentives matter.  Banks are key institutions for attracting savings, in the form
of short-term deposits, and converting them into longer-term investments, in the form of loans.
When private capital is genuinely at risk, bankers have strong incentives to gather information
about the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers, which they can then use to determine how,
and on what terms, credit is allocated.  This ensures that investment is directed towards the most
productive purposes and imposes a hard-budget constraint on firms. i  However, when political
pressure distorts bankers' incentives, credit may be directed without due regard to commercial
lending criteria.  These pressures are likely to be especially pronounced for state-owned banks.
In theory, bank privatization might, therefore, have a large effect on financial sector performance
and, in turn, on aggregate long-term growth. 2
However, in practice, bank privatization has not always been successful.  For example,
Chile privatized many public banks in the early 1970s as part of its privatization program.  In
1982, the financial distress of the industrial conglomerates caused by high interest rates and
currency devaluation meant that many firms were unable to service their loans. 3 This forced the
governmenit  to rescue, and re-nationalize, many of the recently privatized banks.  World Bank
(1989) suggests that an inadequate regulatory framework  "allowed [the privatized banks] to be
World Bank (1995) found a strong link between performance of state-owned enterprises and hard budget
constraints. That report also summarizes the literature on hard budget constraints.  Egypt's problems with
overdrafts and government assumption of the liabilities of state-owned enterprises are described in Sherif (1992)
and Sherif and Soos (1993); Poland's efforts to harden budget constraints in Baer and Gray (1994); and China's
tendency to allocate state-owned bank credit and direct governmental subsidies to enterprises with relatively low
productivity in Hwa (1992).
2  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1994) show that a variety of indicators of financial development (including general
measures of financial depth) are all closely aligned with income levels.  Similarly, King and Levine (1993 a,b)
and Levine and Zervos (1996) highlight the strong link between financial development and aggregate growth
rates.  Not only do King and Levine find a strong connection between real per capita growth rates and financial
development, they also find a link between total productivity growth and finance -- which is, perhaps, a more
direct indication that well-developed financial sectors allocate resources better than others.
World Bank (1989, p. 123) notes that some estimates indicate that the non-performing assets of Chile's  banks
might have been as large as 79% of capital and reserves in 1982 and 150% in 1983.acquired by industrial groups, which used them to  make excessive loans to group firms" (p.
127).  In a cross-country analysis,  Cull (1997) finds that financial depth did not increase in
countries that received World Bank loans with conditionalities tied to bank privatization, relative
to countries that received other types of World Bank financial sector loans.5  These results
emphasize that bank privatization might only be successful when accompanied by improved
regulation.
Unlike some other countries that undertook substantial bank privatization, Argentina
tried to improve banking sector regulation and supervision.  In thle 1990s, Argentina gradually
raised capital adequacy ratios, adopted stricter loan classification and provisioninlg  standards,
improved the certification procedure for bank auditors, imposed minimum diversification
standards for bank loan portfolios including lending limits to a single affiliate, maintained high
reserve requirements, and re-created and strengthened the Superintendency of Banking. 6 At the
same time, Argentina took strides to loosen foreign entry restrictions and to privatize state-
7 owned banks, especially those owned by the provinces and municipalities.  Thle  substantial
number of bank privatizations and the improvements in thie  regulatory framework combine to
make Argentina a unique case study -- the benefits of privatization slhould  be especially
noticeable given the attention paid to regulation and supervision.  The data tihat  follow indicate
that state-owned banks allocated credit poorly and tlhus lost capital at a far greater pace thani
Stallings and Brock (1993,  p. 105)  notes that although rules  were  in place to prevent  this. that wvhen  the  groups
found wvays  around  them  the government  made  no effort to prevent  this from happening.
* uI'rther,  Cull (1997)  finds that subsequent  changes  in financial depth  Nvere  actually  smaller  in those  coulntries  that
attcmpted  privatization  without regulatory  reform. However, he  notes  that it is difficult to dmi1w  strong
conclusions  regarding  this because  privatization  without regulitory reform  was  attciipted in only one  case
(  E'gypt).
[:or further  details  see  Ministry of Economics  and Central  Bank  of the Republic  of Arggentina.  Ixpc'rice  anud
Lessons  lroni Financial Market Instability:  The Argentina Experience.  ( 10 Working Party  onl  EIlCmerging  Market
Instability. December.  1996.
7  At the  beginning  of this decade.  each  Argentine  province  had at least  onie  governmcnt-owvned  haink. Of'tthe
nearly  thirty public provincial banks,  almost  half had been  privatized  as  of December.  1996.
2privatized banks; that privatization will likely reduce the fiscai burden associated with re-
capitalizing struggling state-owned banks; and that privatized banks have substantially improved
their loan portfolio quality and operational efficiency.  Although thie  post-privatization period
has not been long, many of the privatized banks appear to be functioning as well as tile largest
private banks in Argentina, a number of which are foreign-owned.
The paper begins by estimating the fiscal impact of privatizing Argentina's  public
provincial banks.  In Section II, using the estimated loss rates, we calculate the future costs of re-
capitalization.  The results indicate that the present value of future re-capitalization far exceeds
the costs associated with privatization, and is large compared to either provincial deficits or
provincial expenditures.8 Section III describes how assets and liabilities were apportioned
between the privatized provincial bank and a "residual" entity, and discusses the fiscal
implications of this strategy.  The privatized bank that was created contained performing assets
from the old public provincial bank which were matched with a nearly equal amount of the old
bank's  (mostly private) liabilities.9 Non-performing assets, and the remaining liabilities, were
retained as a "residual entity" by the province.10 In addition, most provinces agreed to jointly
capitalize the privatized provincial bank with the winning bidder. 11 The sum of these
The fiscal benefits of privatization may even be slightly greater than those estimated here because we ignore any
additional tax revenue that will be collected from the privatized provincial banks.
9
As a result, the sales prices of the privatized entities were quite small, especially in comparison with the size of
the residual entity.
'°  Interestingly, Argentina's bank privatization procedures were quite different from those in Mexico.  While it
may be a bit misleading to compare the larger banks privatized by Mexico with the smaller provincial banks
privatized in Argentina, it is interesting to note that (I) Mexico did not have to create residual entities, (2)
Mexico relied on a more de-personalized (and complicated) auction procedure than did Argentina, and (3) the
prices paid for the Mexican banks were much higher.  Timing effects may explain some of these differences.
Mexico's  privatizations occurred prior to the Tequila Crisis; Argentina's occurred after.  Still, the differences in
the two cases are striking and worthy of further study.  See Unal and Navarro (1995) for further description of
the privatization procedures in Mexico.  On the impact of the Tequila Crisis on the provinces'  decisions to
privatize their banks in Argentina, see Clarke and Cull (1  997a).
Put another way, many provinces decided to maintain ownership of some fraction of the shares of the privatized
entity.  Because they could have presumably sold these shares and used the proceeds for other government
projects, the retained shares should be thought of as a fiscal cost associated with privatization.
3capitalization costs and the eventual losses associated with liquidating the residual entity will be
the realized costs of privatization.12 Importantly, even if no residual entity assets are recovered,
the re-capitalization simulations indicate that the typical province would generate large fiscal
savings from privatizing its public provincial bank.
Another important fiscal issue is the future solvency of the privatized provincial banks.
If privatized provincial banks continue to operate as poorly as public provincial banks, they will
go bankrupt.  Although predicting the future solvency of any bank, public or private, is a
speculative endeavor, the available post-privatization data strongly suggest that the privatized
provincial banks operate quite differently from public provincial banks.  In fact, data presented
in Section IV on credit allocation by sector, operating income and costs, and portfolio quality
indicate that, by 1996, privatized provincial banks operated similarly to the ten largest private
banks in Argentina.  A case can be made, therefore, that the solvency risks posed by privatized
provincial banks are no worse than those posed by the typical private bank -- although it should
be emphasized that the post-privatization experience has not been long, and future data are
required before firmer conclusions can be drawn.  Finally, in Section V, we conclude and draw
lessons from Argentina's bank privatization experience to date.
II  THE COST OF  NOT  PRIVATIZING
Between  1991 and 1996, the net worth of most public provincial banks fell, even in
nominal terms (See Table II  in Appendix II). The notable exception was Banco de La Provincia
de Buenos Aires (hereafter Buenos Aires), whose net worth increased at a pace commensurate
with many well-established private banks.  Given its location and the resulting implications for
12  To some small extent, they were defrayed by the sales price of the privatized entity.
4its business, Buenos Aires'  situation appears to be distinct from those of other public provincial
banks.13 Therefore, Buenos Aires is treated  separately in much of the analysis.
Using balance sheet data from between 1991 and 1996, Appendix 11  estimates the rate at
which provincial, private, and privatized provincial banks' net worth declined relative to total
liabilities (and assets).  The data indicate that loss rates were, on average, much higher for public
provincial banks than for privatized or private banks.  Based upon this data, we derive counter-
factual estimates of the cost of re-capitalizing typical public provincial banks under a variety of
scenarios.
In the simulations, the ratio of  net worth to total liabilities (NW/TL) of the public
provincial bank is assumed to fall at the average rate that NW/TL fell for  public provincial
banks (except Buenos Aires) between 1991 land 1996 (i.e. 9%).  It is also assumed that the
province re-capitalizes the simulated bank every three years so that its ratio of net worth to total
assets is 11.5%, the level dictated by Argentine prudential regulations.14 Finally, it is assumed
that nominal liabilities grow at a rate of 11% per year, the average rate for public provincial
banks during the period.  For a bank with 25,000,000 pesos in reported net worth, a level very
close to the median for public provincial banks (except Buenos Aires) from 1994-96, the
nominal re-capitalization payments would total over 205.5 billion pesos if it remained in public
hands. 5
13
As the flagship of the public banking system, Buenos Aires may be treated somewhat ditferently by regulators
than other public provincial banks.  A full discussion of how, and why, Buenos.  Aires can be publicly owned and
yet apparently function more effectively than other state-owned banks is beyond the scope of this paper.
4  The qualitative results of the re-capitalization simulations presented here are not overly sensitive to the duration
of the re-capitalization cycle.  We get very similar results, for example, if we assume that the province re-
capitalizes its bank every five years.
Is  In this section, we calculate re-capitalization payments over the next hundred years.  For most of the discounting
scenarios presented here, the present value of payments received after that year is quite close to zero.  The
discounted re-capitalization payments, therefore, should be seen as reasonable estimates of the full fiscal cost of
refusing to privatize a public provincial bank.
5Discounted re-payment flows using a 10% interest rate are shown in column 7 of Table
.16 The 10% rate implies a discounted payment stream of 383 million pesos.  Recall that the
simulated bank's total assets were only 217 million pesos at the start of the period (column 3).
To put that 383 million peso figure into better perspective, note that the average size of the
residual entities created to date has been about 46% of the pre-privatization assets, 66% of
liabilities (Table  2).17 If the simulated bank were typical of the privatized provincial banks
created to date, we would expect a residual entity of 125.8 million pesos in liabilities and 100.2
mnillion  in assets.  In general, the costs associated with capitalizing the privatized entity and its
sales price were quite small in comparison with the size of the residual entity (See Section IV for
details).  Ignoring those factors for the moment, if the province recovered none of the assets of
the simulated residual entity, and paid off all its liabilities immediately, the costs would be less
than one-third of the estimates of discounted re-capitalization costs.  Even a province that
An appropriate discount rate should account for the inflation-adjusted opportunity cost of capital. The question is
whose opportunity cost should be used.  An argument can be made that, because the government must divert
resources from the private sector through taxes to pay for re-capitalizations, the appropriate discount is the
private sector's  opportunity cost of capital.  Baumol (1968) states the case as follows: *'The appropriate rate of
discount for public projects is one which measures correctly the social opportunity cost.  The decision to devote
resources to investment in a public project means, given the overall level of employment in the economy, that
these resources will become unavailable for use by the private sector.  And this transfer should be undertaken
whenever a potential project available to the government offers social benefits greater than the loss sustained by
removing these resources from the private sector."  In practice, Quirk and Terasawa (1991) note that this comes
down to using a weighted average of the consumer rate of interest and the pre-tax corporate rate of return as the
government discount rate.  Those authors object to that discount rate because '-the true opportunity cost of a
government project is the value of the best available opportunity foregone  because of the project, not simply the
value of any available opportunity foregone."  Determining the value of the best opportunity foregone  by the
government seems difficult to operationalize, however.
While no single rate is, perhaps, an adequate composite of private rates, recent data indicate that the interest rate
on peso loans is presently 10% (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (IFS). May,
1997). Another school of thought holds that, since the government often borrows to finance its deficit, the
appropriate rate is the one at which it can borrow.  In the U.S., a reasonable proxy is the Treasury Bill rate.  For
Argentina, money markets rates (which in the U.S. case are typically slightly higher than the 30-day T-Bill rate),
are currently 6%, which might suggest a lower discount rate than 10%. In practice, however, the World Bank
uses a 10% discount on many of its long-term projects in Argentina.  Given the other rates, that one seems a
reasonable estimate.
7  These figures exclude data from Santiago del Estero due to measurement problems.  That privatization was
finalized in September, 1996. The Fondo Fiduciario data for the residual entity are dated July 3 1, 1996. and
should, therefore, be an accurate reflection of assets and liabilities at the close of the sale.  The asset and liability
figures from the Central Bank for 1995 for Santiago del Estero are much smaller than those in the residual entity.
6discounted future pesos at a rate as high as 15% would save 6 million pesos if it recovered
nothing from its residual entity. 8  From a fiscal perspective, the choice is clear, even when a
province manages the residual entity as poorly as is possible.  In practice, however, provinces
may be able to recover a significant portion of the residual entities' assets, and may negotiate
their way out of some liabilities.  In those cases, the choice to privatize should be even clearer.
Table 1: Estimates of the Costs  of Re-Capitalizing  a Typical Public  Provincial  Bank
Ratio  of Net Worth  to Assets  in  Year 1:  .115 (Arg.  Requirement)
Net Worth  in Year 1:  25,000,000
Loss  Rate in Ratio  of Net Worth  to Liabilities:  .090 (Sample  Mean,  Prov)*
Rate of Growth  in Nominal  Liabilities:  .113  (Sample  Mean,  1996)*
Discount  Rate is 10%  for Present  Value  Calculations*
Year  Net Worth  Total  Total  Implied  Nominal  PV
Assets  Liabilities  Asset  Re-Cap.  Re-Cap.
Growth  Payment  Payment
During
millions  millions  millions  Cycle  Inmillions  millions
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
1  25  217  192  .020  0  0
3  -11.9  226  238  .020  42.9  29.3
6  -14.8  280  295  .020  53.1  27.2
9  -18.3  347  366  .020  65.8  25.3
12  -22.6  430  453  .020  81.5  23.6
96  -9092.0  172747  181839  .020  32731.0  3.2
99  -11262.8  213994  225257  .020  35881.6  2.6
Total  205515  383
Simulated re-capitalization costs are large not only in comparison with the residual
entity, but also with respect to other fiscal variables.  In 1996, the average expenditures for the
provinces that had privatized their banks was 720 million pesos; their average deficit was 21
million (Table 3).  The 383 million pesos, therefore, represent over half of yearly government
Inflation  in 1995  was  relatively  low,  so it seems  implausible  that nominal  assets and liabilities  could have
increased  so much  as to permit  a residual  entity  larger  than the old public  provincial  bank.
8  Qualitatively similar results for simulations that assume ditferent scenarios for loss rates in net worth appear in
Appendix  1.
7expenditures.  In every third year, re-capitalization payments of 20-30 million pesos would more
than double the typical  1996 deficit.  Even under the assumption that the province manages the
residual entity as poorly as possible, the savings from privatization (257 million pesos) would
amount to a third of yearly government expenditures and could fulalice 1996 deficits for over
twelve years. 9  In short, the potential fiscal savings associated with privatization are large, eveni
with counter-factual re-capitalization estimates designed to be conservative.  Had we used a
discount factor of 5%, for example, the discounted re-capitalization stream would hiave  been 4.2
billion pesos -- six years of provincial expenditures, enough to finance the equivalent of  a 20
million peso deficit (in 1996) for some two hundred years.
One might argue that public provincial bank quality has improved, or that the remaining
banks are of higher quality than those that have already privatized, and thus the 9% loss rate in
NW/TL overstates future losses.  If the remaining public provincial banks are better ones (and
thius have lower loss rates), their quality should be reflected in a smaller residual entity.20 Their
discounted re-capitalization payments may be smaller than for the early privatizers but, because
these payments are offset by the liabilities of a much smaller residual entity, privatization wi  ll
also make sense for them  -- unless, of course, these banks are of such high quality tilat thley
experience no losses in the future.  The data on net worth and NW/TL, and that presented in
Section IV on operating income and costs, however, make that proposition especially dubious. 21
19  The  comparisons  with 1996  deficits  are for illustrative  purposes  only. Deficits  were, however,  relatively  small  in
that year. The average  1995  deficit  for privatizers  was 140  million  pesos;  in 1994  it was  84 million. It is unclear
to us whether  the 1996  deficits  or those from prior  years are better  estimates  of future  deficits.
20  See regression  in Section  IV  on the relationship  between  public  provincial  bank  portfolio  quality  and the size  of
the residual  entity.
21  Leaving  Buenos  Aires  aside,  those  public  provincial  banks  that have not begun  the privatization  process  did have
slightly  better  pre-privatization  performance  than those  that eventually  privatized. However,  the disparities  are
not particularly striking.  Non-privatizers had an average nominal net worth of 66 million pesos, and experienced
declines  in nominal  net worth of 853,000  pesos per  year and in  NW/TL  of 8.2%  per year. Their nominal  assets
grew at a rate of 31.8%.  A quick comparison with the figures in Table 11 indicates that non-privatizers are much
more similar to public provincial banks that eventually privatized than they are to the private banks.
822 Table 2:  Residual Entities as a Percentage of Pre-Privatization Assets/Liabilities
Residual entity  Year  Assets  Assets as a %  Liabilities  Liab. as a % of
Created  of Assets in  Liab. in Year
Year Prior to  Prior to Priv.
millions  Priv.  millions
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Chaco  1995  245.3  54.0  233.1  56.8
Formosa  1995  135.7  36.7  244.9  83.4
Mendoza  1996  666.6  61.2  666.6  71.4
Misiones  1995  144.2  28.6  331.8  66.0
Prev. Social  1996  292.1  49.7  292.1  56.4
Rio Negro  1996  49.2  24.6  47.4  26.2
Salta  1996  91.6  73.3  73.4  74.2
San Juan  1996  78.6  34.2  175.3  66.9
San Luis  1996  29.7  31.6  81.8  90.1
Sant del Est  1996  199.6  *81.1  227.3  *84.4
Tucuman  1996  261.7  66.7  262.9  70.2
Average  . 199.5  **46.1  239.7  **66.1
*The  asset data  for Santiago  del Estero  implied  that their  residual  entity  was 135%  of pre-privatization  assets,  an
obviously  unrealistic  estimate.  The figures  reported  here for Santiago  del Estero  are,  therefore,  based  on their reported
assets in the year of their privatization  (1996). See footnote 17  for further  discussion  of the Santiago  del Estero  data.
**Calculation  excludes  Santiago  del Estero.
Table 3:  Fiscal Situation of Provinces in 1996
Sample  Avg. Expenditures  Avg. Revenues  Deficits
(million of pesos)  (millions of pesos)  (millions of pesos)
1. All Provinces  2,195.2  2,263.3  68.1
2. Provinces Except  1,075.0  1,105.2  30.2
Buenos Aires
3. Provinces that have  698.8  719.9  21.2
Privatized Provincial
Banks
Source: Ministry  of Economy  (National  Directorate  for Fiscal  Coordination  with  the Provinces)
III  THE PRIVATIZATION  PROCESS  AND  ITS FISCAL  IMPLICATIONS
The quality  of the  bank's  portfolio,  in practice,  determines  the  size of the residual  entity.
Although  a poor  portfolio  largely  reflects  past performance  and, therefore,  has nothinig to do with
the  privatization  process  per se, opponents  are  likely to claim,  at least  in the court  of public
22  Notes: Prev Social  is  the former  Banco  de Prevision  Social  de La  Provincia  de Mendoza;  Sant del Est is the
forner Banco  de La  Provincia  de Santiago  del Estero.  Source:  Fondo  Fiduciario.  Assets  in  the year prior to
privatization  (used  to construct  data in  columns  4 and 6) come  from B.C.R.A.  balance  sheet  data.
9opinion, that the realized losses are due to privatization.  In all observed cases, the purchaser of
the privatized entity did not assume ownership of all pre-privatization assets and liabilities.
While this might seem strange from an economic perspective -- buyers could have simply paid
negative prices (i.e. been paid by the province) -- political reality and the buyer's desire to "start
afresh" dictated that a residual entity be created to ensure a positive price.
Although the individual cases varied, the basic strategy was to shift attractive assets to
the privatized entity and then match those assets with liabilities, while leaving the privatized
entity with sufficient net worth.  The key determinant of the size of the residual entity was,
therefore, the quality of the public provincial bank's assets (See Table 4).
Table  4: Size of Residual  Entities
Bank  % of Pre-Priv.  % of Pre-Priv.  % non-  % Normal  Physical Assets
Assets  Liabil.  performing  Pre-Priv.  as % of Pre-
Pre-Priv.  Priv. Assets
(1994)  (1994)
Chaco  54.0  51.3  **32.6  **52.6  8.9
Formosa  36.7  66.2  4.0  79.4  2.5
Mendoza  61.2  61.2  20.2  49.5  0.3
Misiones  28.6  65.8  12.5  71.6  5.3
Prv Soc Men  49.7  49.7  34.2  43.4  1.0
Rio Negro  24.6  23.7  47.3  28.4  1.2
Salta  73.3  58.7  75.9  7.5  4.5
San Juan  34.2  76.4  23.1  68.8  1.5
San Luis  31.6  87.1  12.9  80.9  35.5
Sant del Est  *81.1  *84.4  ***71.8  ***13.8  3.7
Tucuman  66.7  67.0  53.4  43.8  4.6
Sources: See Table  2 with  regard  to % of pre-privatization  assets  and liabilities  in the residual  entity. The  % non-
performing  and the % normal  loans  data  comes  from B.C.R.A.  balance  sheets. Data  on physical  assets  comes  from
Fondo  Fiduciario  balance  sheets  for residual  entities  at the time of privatization.  * Calculations  described  in Table  2.
**  1993  data  were used. By 1994,  the effects  of privatization  were evident  in Chaco's portfolio  quality  data.  ***  1993
data  were used. No data were  available  for 1994.
A simple regression shows that the worse the public provincial bank's portfolio, the
larger the residual entity. 23
23  The observation  for San  Luis  was dropped  from the estimation  because  the physical  assets  reported  in its residual
entity balance  sheet  implied  an implausibly  high  percentage  of those  assets in its portfolio  (Table  4). Although
not reported  here,  the qualitative  result  is similar  when  % normal  loans  replaces  % non-performing  in the
regression  -- a high percentage  of normal  loans  implies  a smaller  residual  entity. These  results  are for  portfolio
quality  measured  prior  to privatization  -- before  the pre-privatization  audit. Similar  qualitative  results  obtain,
however,  when  post-audit  portfolio  quality  replaces  the pre-audit  measures  in the regression.  The  only
10% Assets = 27.8 + .548 (% non-performing) + .798 (% physical assets)
(t-stat)  (2.53)  (2.49)  (0.39)
N=9, Adj. R-Squared .352.24
Results for physical assets are less compelling.  Although the coefficient is positive, it is
not statistically significant.  Given so few observations, however, provincial policy makers
should consider the possibility that physical assets might increase the size of their residual entity
and might require a different liquidation strategy than financial assets.
In some cases the public provincial bank had negative net worth when privatized
(ensuring that residual liabilities will be larger than residual assets.).  In these cases, no matter
how successful the recovery of residual assets, the provinces will face net losses.  In the two
worst cases (Formosa and Misiones), residual liabilities exceed assets by  100-200 million pesos.
Althiough  these losses are substantial, as the simulation results indicate, from a fiscal perspective
privatization is still the best choice.  For Misiones and Formosa, banks whose assets were
roughly twice the size of the simulated bank in Section II, the discounted re-capitalization
stream would total well over 500 million pesos, substantially more than the 200-350 million
pesos they face in residual liabilities.
While residual asset recovery will, hopefully, proceed quickly, it will neither be quick
enough,  nor on such advantageous terms, to cover most residual liabilities -- even in those cases
where assets exceed liabilities.  As a result, provinces needed some way to meet a substantial
difference is that the pre-audit coefficient is somewhat larger than the post-audit measure, indicating yet again
that problems will likely be more severe than indicated prior to the pre-privatization audit.
24  "%  non-performing" is the percentage of total loans in the worst two B.C.R.A. loan classifications The physical
asset variable is the percentage of pre-privatization assets that ended up in residual entity balance sheets under
the heading "bienes de uso."  Many of the public provincial banks had an abundance of branches and buildings
that purchasers might have preferred not to own (so they would not have to re-sell them later).  The dependent
variable is the percentage of pre-privatization assets shifted to the residual entity (see Table 2).  B.C.R.A.
changed its loan classification guidelines in 1994 so that the bottom three categories -- those with problems and
deficient coverage, those with high risk of borrower insolvency and recovery difficulty, and  those deemed
unrecoverable -- are now considered non-performing ("bad credits").  The portfolio quality data used in the
regressions discussed in this section are for loans classified under the old guidelines.
IIportion of their residual obligations immediately.  In an effort to address this, the Argentinean
Government and the World Bank developed the Fondo Fiduciario, a part of the federal
government that extends loans to provinces that have privatized their provincial banks.  The
provinces used the loan proceeds to pay off obligations.  In this way, some short-term obligations
were converted to longer terms.  From a political perspective, financilig obligations in this way
was clever, as the yearly loan payments due to the Fondo are less eye-catching than the short-
term obligation payments would have been. 25
The Fondo Fiduciario's experience to date is summarized in Table 5.  For the smaller
residual entities (below 200 million pesos in liabilities), Fondo Fiduciario loans typically
covered well over half of their liabilities.  For medium-sized residual entities (200-300 million
pesos), Fondo loans met roughly one-third of their obligations.  For the two largest residual
entities, these loans covered less than a quarter of total liabilities.  Clearly, those provinces with
the largest residual liabilities will have the most pressure to re-coup residual assets quickly, as
they were able to re-finance a relatively small portion of their obligations throughi  the Fondo.  It
is also interesting to note that, in each case, at least half of the loan proceeds went to retire
obligations to two creditors -- B.C.R.A. and Banco de la Nacion.26 Although the data provided
by Fondo Fiduciario does not indicate why or when these debts were incurred, both B.C.R.A. and
Banco de la Nacion were important sources of liquidity for the public provincial banks,
especially during the Tequila Crisis.
In those cases where a relatively small share of liabilities were financed through the
Fondo, the short-term fiscal implications of privatization will depend largely on the province's
ability to negotiate its way out of liabilities and to recover provincial assets.  There is little
25  Assuming the terms of the loans are reasonable, the re-financing should, of course, make little difference from an
economic (i.e., present value) perspective.
26  In many cases, 80-90% of the proceeds went to those creditors.
12available evidence on the provinces' experiences to date.  The Fondo Fiduciario had balance
sheets for only three residual entities both at their inception and at some point later (when asset
recovery and liability retirement should have already begun).  Unfortunately, the balance sheet
data for these three cases do not give any indications as to the terms on which the assets were
recovered or liabilities retired.  Assets may have been recovered at a rate of pennies on the
dollar, while liabilities may have been retired at face value.
Table  5: Fondo  Fiduciario  Assistance
Bank  Residual  Total Loan  Undisbursed  Debts  Paid  to  Debts  Paid  to
Liabilities  from FF  as of 2/4/97  B.C.R.A.  Banco  De La
(millions)  (millions) 27 Nacion
Chaco  233.1  78.0  0  78.0  0
Entre Rios  N/A.  78.0  0  45.3  0
Formosa  244.9  80.0  0  32.2  37.7
Jujuy  N/A.  50.0  33.3  16.6  0
Mendoza  666.6  160.0  0  89.7  70.3
Prv Soc  Men  292.1  100.0  0  79.3  20.7
Misiones  331.8  78.0  0  20.2  47.6
Rio Negro  47.4  80.0  0  32.3  11.5
Salta  73.4  50.0  0  16.7  9.5
San Juan  175.3  78.0  0  43.7  34.3
San Luis  81.8  50.0  0  21.0  0
Santa Fe  N/A.  160.0  160.0  N/A.  N/A.
Sant  del Est  227.3  50.0  33.3  3.0  0.0
Tucuman  262.9  80.0  25.0  53.6  18.1
Source:  Fondo  Fiduciario
In many cases the province contracted the owner of the privatized entity to
collect residual assets. The private owners receive a higher percentage of face value for
recovering lower quality assets (i.e., loans for which re-payment problems have been most
chronic).  To the extent that residual balance sheets reflect the face value of assets, such
contracts make it impossible for the province to receive compensation for the full value of its
residual assets.  This is not, of course, to imply that these contracts are a bad deal for provinces --
indeed, it is likely that private entities with the appropriate incentives are best equipped to re-
27  Fondo  Fiduciario  loans  data  are  reported  in  U.S.  dollars.  Residual  liability  data  are  reported  in  pesos.  Since  the
exchange  rate  is pegged  so  that  a peso  is worth  a dollar,  this  presents  little  problem.
13coup  assets.  Rather,  we merely  point out that,  in many  cases,  the upper  bound  on asset  collection
may  be  somewhat  lower than  what  is reflected  in residual  balance  sheets.
Table 6: Total Fiscal Costs Associated With Privatization Under Various Residual Asset Recovery
Scenarios
Province  Amount  Value of  Total  Total  Total  Total Fiscal  Total Fiscal
Paid for  Privat.  Liabil. of  Assets of  Fiscal  Costs of  Costs of
Privat.  Shares  Residual  Residual  Costs of  Privati-  Privati-
Entity  Retained  Entity  Entity  Privati-  zation:  zation:
by Prov.  zation:  0%  20% Asset  50% Asset
(millions  (millions  (millions  (millions  Asset  Recovery  Recovery
pesos)  pesos) 28  pesos)  pesos)  Recovery
[3+2-1]
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Chaco  6.3  2.9  233.1  245.3  229.7  180.6  107.0
Ent Rios  15.1  N/A.  N/A.  N/A.  N/A.  N/A.
Formosa  9.3  4.0  244.9  135.7  239.6  212.4  171.7
Mendoza  20.1  0.6  666.6  666.6  647.1  513.8  313.8
PS Mend  8.2  0.2  292.1  292.1  284.1  225.7  138.0
Misiones  9.1  0.0  331.8  144.2  322.7  293.9  250.6
R Negro  10.2  1.8  47.4  49.2  39.0  29.2  14.4
Salta  4.4  1.1  73.4  91.6  70.1  51.8  24.3
San Juan  11.3  3.8  175.3  78.6  167.8  152.1  128.5
San Luis  5.4  0.0  81.8  29.7  76.5  70.5  61.6
Sant Est  6.7  0.0  227.3  199.6  220.7  180.7  120.9
Tucuman  10.3  2.6  262.9  261.7  255.2  202.9  124.4
Source: Fondo  Fiduciario.
Notes: N/A.- not applicable.  In the Entre  Rios  privatization,  no residual  entity  was created. As computed  here,  the
total cost estimates  are not meaningful  for that case.  PS Mend is  the former  Prevision  Social  de Mendoza;  R  Negro is
Rio  Negro;  and Sant  Est is Santiago  del Estero.  The  value  of shares  left in public  hands is an indication  of the
capitalization  costs  borne  by the province. Most  of the amounts  paid for  privatized  entities  went back  to the new
private  banks  either  in the form of capital  integrated  or as deposits  made  by the provincial  government.  These  small
amounts  should  not, therefore,  be seen as necessarily  having  improved  the fiscal  situation  of the provinces.
Given  so little  data,  analyzing  the  effect of the  liquidation  contracts  on asset  recovery  is
beyond  the scope  of this  paper.  In the future,  however,  such an  analysis  may  be possible,
although  it would  require  very detailed  data on the quality  of the  assets  recovered,  the terms  of
each  liquidation  contract,  and  the terms  on which  credits  were  re-paid.  Table 6 summarizes  the
total  fiscal  costs  associated  with privatization  for individual  provinces  under  various  asset
2S  Because  the province  could  presumably  sell  them,  the eventual  fiscal  implications  of any shares  it holds  in the
privatized  entity  are likely  to be negligible.  However,  there is an opportunity  cost associated  with not selling
them  that should  probably  be considered  among  the costs of privatization.
14recovery scenarios.  The total potential short-term costs associated with privatization are equal to
the sum of any capitalization costs borne by the province and residual entity liabilities, minus the
price paid for the privatized entity (column 5).  Final privatization costs will depend on the
extent to wlhich  provinces recover residual assets.  Column 6 lists total privatization costs
assuming that 20% of residual assets are recovered; Column 7 assumes a 50% recovery rate.
Clearly, total costs will be quite sensitive to the success of the recovery effort.  The total cost
estimates in Table 7 assume that the province pays off all of the residual liabilities.  To the extent
that they are able to negotiate their way out of some liabilities, the total cost figures in columns
5-7 should be reduced.  The bulk of the short-term fiscal implications will, thierefore,  derive from
the terms on which the residual entity is liquidated.  The Fondo Fiduciario loan data, moreover,
should be some guide as to the post-privatization financing assistance that provinces might
expect.
IV  PRIVATIZED  PROVINCIAL  BANKS:  INDICATORS  OF FUTURE  SOLVENCY
Owners of privatized provincial banks should face the same incentives as other private
bankers in Argentina.  To the extent that prudential regulations and bank supervision are
adequate -- and all indications are that both have improved substantially in the 1990s -- neither
privatized nor private banks should be so crisis-prone that they pose a substantial bail-out risk,
especially when one considers that Argentina's present system of deposit insurance has a
disciplining effect on member banks.29 In a country with a strong private deposit insurance
2')  That system  is partly privately  managed  and imposes  high  premia  (.36-.72%  of deposits,  depending  on the class
of deposit)  by international  standards  on member  banks. In Denmark,  another  country  with  privately  managed
deposit  insurance,  premia  payments  are only  .2%  of deposits. In Colombia  premia  are .15%  of deposits;  in
Mexico  they are .3% -- and coverage  per depositor  is unlimited.  Membership  in Argentina's  program,  moreover,
is compulsory.  Details  regarding  deposit  insurance  programs  are drawn  from, Alexander  Kyei,  "Deposit
Protection  Arrangements:  A Survey,"  IMF  Working  Paper  No. WP/95/134, Monetary  and Exchange  Affairs
Department,  Dec., 1995,  and Samuel  Talley  and Ignacio  Mas,  "Deposit  Insurance  in Developing  Countries,"
World  Bank  Policy  Research  and External  Affairs  Working  Paper  No, 548, 1990.
15program, provinces that privatized their banks should have little incentive to bail out troubled
institutions.30
However, owners of privatized provincial banks are not in exactly the same situation as
other private bankers -- most received a contract to continue providing banking services to the
province as part of their sales agreement.  As banker to the provincial government,  privatized
provincial banks maintain a privileged position within the banking industry whicil may distort
incentives.  In this section, we compare privatized provincial banks with well-established private
ones to determine whether they operate similarly.  Available post-privatization data strongly
suggest that, despite their service contracts with the provinces, privatized provincial banks did
change their operations substantially.  Their similarities withi  private banks are now far more
pronounced than their similarities with the remaining public provincial banks.  Importantly,
although we cannot quantify the social welfare benefits, the data indicate that credit allocation is
improving.  While the focus of this paper is on the fiscal benefits to the provinces -- which
appear to be quite substantial -- it is quite likely that the most important benefit of  privatization
is the economic growth that should follow from improved credit allocation.  Indeed, these
benefits could make it wise to privatize even if the fiscal calculus did not favor privatization.
IV.1  Operating Income and Costs
The pubic provincial banks' low ratio of operating income to administrative costs is one
indicationi  of their inefficiency.  Between 1993 and 1996 the typical public provincial bank
generated only .77 pesos in total income (net financial income and income from services) for
every peso spent on administrative costs (Table 7). The typical private bank, in contrast,
generated 1.44 pesos in income for every peso incurred in costs and the typical privatized
30  We  recognize,  however,  that systemic  bank crises  do occur,  and that governments  often intervene  to prevent
financial  system  collapse. See Gerard  Caprio,  Jr. and Daniela  Klingebiel,  "Bank Insolvencies:  Cross  Country
Experience,"  World  Bank,  April,  1996. However,  it should  also be noted  that, in the event  of systemic  crisis,  the
bail-out  responsibility  likely  devolves  to the federal  rather  the provincial  governments.
16provincial bank generated 1.41 pesos in income per peso of cost.  There was, however, a
difference between privatized and private banks in the composition of income. About two-thirds
of the income of private banks was financial income, while only a third was from services.  In
contrast, over half of the income of the privatized banks was generated through services, perhaps
due to their unique relationship with the provincial governments.  As described below, however,
that relationship is far less pronounced in credit allocation decisions -- neither private nor
privatized provincial banks lend much to the public sector.  Other than this, Table 7 indicates
that the privatized provincial banks generate income as efficiently as large private banks, and far
more efficiently that the remaining public provincial banks.
Table 7: Ratios of Income  to Cost
Financial  Income  from  Total
Income/Administrative  Services/Administrative  Income/Administrative
Costs  Costs  Costs
Mean  Mean  Mean
Overall:X
Private  .915  .529  1.44
Provincial  .375  .402  .778
Privatized  .669  .736  1.41
1994:
Private  .764  .543  1  .307
Provincial  .524  .386  .911
Privatized  .413  .798  1.211
1995:
Private  .883  .494  1  .377
Provincial  .245  .339  .584
Privatized  .633  .751  1.385
1996:
Private  1.088  .506  1  .595
Provincial  -.026  .425  .399
Privatized  .758  .742  1.501
Data  Source: B.C.R.A.
Notes: The privatized  sample  includes  only those  banks  that had completed  their privatization  as of March,  1996.
Only  these  cases  provided  at least six months  of post-privatization  data  on income  and costs. The cases  include  Chaco,
Corrientes,  Entre  Rios, Formosa,  La Rioja,  Misiones,  Rio Negro,  and Salta. The private  sample  includes  the ten largest
private  banks in Argentina  as of 1996. All  public  provincial  banks  are included  in the provincial  sample,  including
pre-privatization  observations  for  the eight  banks in the privatized  sample. In those years  where  data were  available
for only a sub-sample  of months  for a given  bank,  the data  were annualized.  For  example.  for Salta in 1996,  costs  and
income  data  were totaled  over  the six  months for  which  data were  available,  and then multiplied  by two.
17Although, the privatized bank data are from different years (1995-96) than the private
bank data (1993-1996), this does not appear to be driving the results.3'  Table 7, which shows
income and cost data broken down by year, indicates that the privatized and private banks
generated comparable levels of total income per peso of cost each year that data on privatized
provincial banks are available (1994-1996).  Privatized provincial banks did generate a higher
share of income through services than private banks each year but, in terms of efficiency in
generating total income, their performances were remarkably similar to their well-established
private competitors, and markedly better than the remaining public provincial banks.  Total
income outpaced administrative costs by a wide margin for the typical privatized and private
bank every  year.  This should inspire some confidence in the future solvency of these
iistitutions.  In contrast, the financial and service income of the public provincial banks failed to
outpace administrative costs every year.
The improved performance of the public provincial banks is not, moreover, the result of
improved performance in only one or two banks.  In every instance in which the ratio of total
income to administrative costs was less than one prior to privatization, the post-privatization
ratio was greater than one (Table 8).  This increased efficiency has coincided with substantial
portfolio growth.  Assets and liabilities have typically more than doubled in the years since
privatization.  It does not appear that privatized banks were content merely to maintain the
portfolios that they inherited.  Growth in assets has been fueled by the privatized banks' ability
to attract deposits, which have increased at about the same pace as overall liabilities.
Substantial post-privatization improvement in the ratio of portfolio income to
administrative costs suggests that new loans created from the increase in deposits have been
profitable.  Figures on branches and employment make it clear that the improved operating
In particular,  the  "Tequila Crisis" which occurred  late  in 1994  is unlikely to be causing  the results.
18margins are not merely the result of cost cutting.  Since privatization, the number of branches
decreased only slightly, if.at all, for each bank.32 Although some labor shedding has occurred,
in no case has the work force been reduced by more than 15%.  In summary, the data indicate
that remaining employees generate profit far more efficiently than before.  This suggests that the
banks'  loan portfolios became far more commercially oriented after privatization.  Credit
allocation data presented in the next sub-section provides additional support for this hypothesis.
Table 8:  Ratios of Income to Costs Before and after Privatization
Fin  Serv  Total  Assets  Liabil.  Net  Depo-  Loans  #  #  Date
Inc/  Inc/  Inc/  Worth  sits  Bra  Em-
Costs  Costs  Costs  . nch  ploy.
Mean  Mean  Mean  Pesos  Pesos  Pesos  Pesos  Pesos
000s  IOOOsS  OOOs  IOOOs  I000s
Chaco
Before  -.379  .173  -.206  42883  34483  8400  10950  140  28  615  11/94
After  .683  .683  1.366  220335  207088  13247  130995  63012  28  547  10/96
EntreRios
Before  -.161  .461  .300  395548  384548  11000  211900  226121  55  1542  1/95
After  .726  .521  1.247  667609  614133  53476  503221  372225  68  1340  11/96
Formosa
Before  -1.589  .270  -1.319  26569  11569  15000  11569  5489  10  230  12/95
After  .318  .733  1.051  129578  113064  16514  97379  77946  10  221  11/96
Misiones
Before  -.530  .333  -.197  70498  61498  9000  48131  47325  30  433  2/96
After  .475  .890  1.364  157543  142820  14723  105159  77999  29  422  11/96
Rio Negro
Before  .333  .472  .805  49162  47362  1800  42212  41767  21  425  3/96
After  .610  .524  1.134  134984  122142  12842  87640  85988  29  416  11/96
Salta
Before  3.090  .289  3.379  58941  52711  6230  40892  18000  16  260  3/96
After  2.381  .842  3.223  250860  240924  9936  201988  173074  15  301  11/96
Data Sources:  B.C.R.A. and Fondo Fiduciario
Notes:  The data on income and costs cover only 1993-96.  Since Corrientes privatized in 1992, no pre-privatization
data was available.  For La Rioja, which privatized in 1994, pre-privatization data were not available because the bank
had suspended operations in 1993. This leaves only the six cases listed above.
32  In some instances, owners of privatized banks are required to maintain a certain number of branches under the
terms of their purchase agreements.
19IV.2  Credit  Allocation
Portfolio composition data for privatized, provincial, and private banks in June,  1996 are
presented in Table 9.  While time series data on portfolio composition would show the evolution
of privatized provincial bank credit allocation over time, the snapshot presented here is also
telling.33 In general, regardless of the industry, the percent of total credits rated good was
highest among private banks.  The better established privatized provincial banks (those that
privatized prior to April, 1996) eclipsed the private banks on one measure -- the percentage of
good credits to the government services sector (99.9 versus 99.6%).  The earliest privatizers
approached the private bank percentages on two other measures -- family loans (77.2 versus
84.9% good credits) and construction (83.3 versus 91.8%).  It is important to note that the private
bank sample contains only the ten largest in Argentina, presumably among the best banks in the
country.34 The percentage of good credit in other sectors (primary production, manufacturing,
utilities, trade, and other services) was  somewhat lower for the early privatizers than for private
banks as of 1996.
In general early privatizers had higher good credit percentages than either public
provincial banks, recent privatizers (since June, 1996), or those that had begun but not completed
the privatization process ("beginners").  Public provincial banks had slightly higher good credit
percentages than early privatizers in only two categories -- primary production and utilities.
Further, there are two reasons why the good credit percentages for the public provincial banks
are likely to be significantly overstated.  First, several measures of performance (nominal assets,
net worth, and NW/TL) of privatized banks appear to have declined quite remarkably during the
We did also have credit allocation data for December, 1995. However, for the five categories of banks in Table
9 the qualitative differences between that data and the 1996 data were not great. As a result, we present only the
1996 data.
34  Of course, because all new loans are good loans, it will more telling to observe privatized provincial banks'
portfolio quality in coming years.  They do, however, appear to be starting on very solid footing.
20last year of public management (see Table I I and Figure 4 throughi Figure 6 in Appendix 11).
This apparent decline was probably due to  rigorous pre-privatization audits whichi  typically
occurred at this time.  This would also explain the extremely low percentages of good credits for
recent and beginning privatizers in Table 9 -- those banks hiad  undergone pre-privatization audits
but had not benefited from the creation of a residual entity.  Data for beginninig  and recent
privatizers are, therefore, probably more reflective of the actual situation of the remaining public
provincial banks than the data on public banks in Table 9.
Table  9: Credit  Allocation  by Industry,  1996
Bank  Primary  Manuf.  Const.  Utilities  Trade  Gov't  Other  Family
Type  Prod.  Srvcs.  Srvcs.  Loans
(%)  (%)  )  ()  (  )  ((%)  (%)
Prov.
Avg shr  11.6  20.2  4.0  0.2  12.8  17.6  7.2  15.6
%Good  52.2  41.9  53.8  75.2  43.2  93.9  63.8  71.9
(n=8)
EstPrv
Avg shr  7.2  6.4  5.8  .06  15.4  11.8  6.2  11.8
%Good  45.7  63.2  83.3  69.4  57.1  99.9  66.3  77.2
(n=8)
RecPrv
Avg shr  15.6  11.4  11.6  .04  20.4  10.2  14.6  6.2
%Good  18.8  11.2  22.4  18.4  13.1  82.7  29.6  55.1
(n=6)
!ntPrv
Avg shr  11.8  12.6  5.6  .22  28.8  14.8  7.0  15.0
%Good  25.7  37.2  25.3  83.8  32.0  80.7  35.1  59.9
(n=5)
Private
Avg shr  6.8  23.0  4.4  3.2  10.4  4.4  10.8  25.2
%Good  90.3  90.1  91.8  99.4  83.1  99.6  91.2  84.9
(n  =  I0)  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Data  Source: B.C.R.A.
Notes: Prov  covers  those  eight public  provincial  banks  that have  taken  no steps  toward  privatization  (Buenos  Aires,
Chubut,  Cordoba,  Social  de Cordoba,  La Pampa,  Neuquen,  Santafesino  de Inversion,  and Cofirene  Banco  de
Inversion).  EstPrv  covers  better  established  privatized  provincial  banks  -- those that had completed  privatization  as of
March,  1996  (Chaco,  Corrientes,  Entre  Rios,  Formosa,  La Rioja,  Misiones,  Rio  Negro, and Salta). RecPrv  covers
recently  privatized  provincial  banks,  those that completed  their privatizations  in  the last half  of 1996  (Mendoza,
Prevision  Social  de Mendoza,  San Juan,  San Luis, Santiago  del Estero,  and Tucuman). BegPrv  covers  those banks  that
have begun but  not completed  the privatization  process  (Catamarca,  Juiuy, Santa  Cruz,  Santa Fe,  and Tierra  del
Fuego). Private  includes  the ten largest  private  banks  in Argentina  in 1996. The  columns  of each row  do not sum  to
one because  we have  omitted  a catch-all  category  called  "other  loans."
21Second, the figures for public provincial banks include Buenos Aires, a case apart from
the others.  When Buenos Aires data are removed, the percentage of good credits in each
category drops by about 5%.  After removing Buenos Aires and correcting for potential
overstatements, the percentages of good credits will almost certainly trail those for the earliest
privatizers by an even greater amount.  Therefore, it is fair to conclude that, as of 1  996, the
earliest privatizers had much higher quality portfolios thani  the remaining public provincial
banks.
Whether the privatized banks can maintain quality is another important question.
Indications are, however, positive.  Of the early privatizers, nearly half have been private for at
least two years -- the averages in Table 9, therefore, reflect some ability to maintain the portfolio
quality inherited after purging residual assets and liabilities.  In addition, the operating income
and cost data presented above is encouraging.  At the very least, beginning and recent privatizers
can take heart that, in the cases to date, the provinces have been able to create a privatized entity
whose initial portfolio quality approaches that of the top private banks.
It is more difficult to draw strong conclusions regarding portfolio composition.  To some
extent, the composition may depend upon the resource endowments of the province in which the
bank resides.  It is difficult, therefore, to argue that the industrial composition of  the private
bank portfolios is inherently superior to that of the other banks, and that we should expect
privatized provincial. banks to create similar portfolios over time.  We might, however, expect
less credit to be allocated to the government once political incentives have been replaced by
purely economic ones.  The data indicate that the remaining public provincial banks have the
highest share of their portfolios concentrated in government services (17.6%), followed by
beginning privatizers (14.8%).  Recent and early privatizers allocate a little more than 10% of
their portfolios to government services, while private banks devote a little less than 5% of theirs
22to the sector,  It appears that credit to the public sector does decline in importance after
privatization, and that this portfolio shift does coincide with improved portfolio quality.
Individual bank data confirms this observation. Table 10 shows public sector credit data
before and after privatization for the eight banks that privatized prior to April,  1996. With the
exception of Entre Rios, the privatized banks have substantially lower nominal credits to the
public sector.  Interestingly, the banks that now have the higlhest  shares of bad credits are those
that had the highest shares of public credit prior to privatization -- the two worst performers, La
Rioja and Corrientes, loaned over 90% of their pre-privatization credit to the public sector.  It is
possible that these banks lacked both experience lending to the private sector and an established
private clientele. In summary, when the pre-privatization share of credit to the public sector was
low, and where there was a substantial reduction in nominal public credit, portfolio quality (as
measured by the share of bad credits) has improved substantially.  In fact, the average share of
bad credit for the five banks satisfying these criteria is a little over 5%, slightly lower than for
the private bank sample from 1994-96.35
3S  Admittedly,  the low shares  of bad credit  for some  banks in Table 10  may  merely  reflect  that all bad credits
passed  to the residual  entity. Their  "steady-state"  bad credit  shares  may  turn out to be a bit higher.
23Table 10: Credit  to the Public  Sector,  Before  and After Privatization
Bank  Credit  to Public  Credit  to Public  Credit  to Public  Credit  to Public  Bad  Credits  as
Sector,  Pre-  Sector,  Post-  Sector,  Pre-  Sector,  Post-  a Percentage  of
Privatization  Privatization  Privatization  Privatization  Total
(Millions  of Pesos)  (Millions  of Pesos)  (% of Total)  (% of Total)  1996
Chaco  379,892  (1994)  223  (1996)  46.5  0.4  13.8
Corrientes  378,469  (1992)  1,458  (1996)  90.9  15.6  35.2
Entre  Rios  115,389  (1994)  108,281  (1996)  17.0  23.8  21.7
Formosa  54,065  (1994)  0 (1996)  20.7  0.0  0.0
La Rioja  379,083  (1991)  0 (1996)  95.8  0.0  28.4
Misiones  164,681  (1994)  38,234  (1996)  33.6  58.6  5.0
Rio  Negro  158,419  (1992)  7,555  (1996)  18.8  9.2  9.1
Salta  33,227 (1995)  15  (1996)  19.5  0.0  0.0
Source:  B.C.R.A.
To summarize, the available data indicate that privatized provincial banks are far more
similar to Argentina's ten largest private banks than they are to public provincial banks.  First,
they appear to operate as profitably and efficiently as the private banks as indicated by their
ratios of operating income to costs.  In addition, their composition of operating income has
shifted slightly towards net financial income as opposed to income from services.  Although the
private banks continue to generate a higher share of their income through financial income, the
privatized provincial banks are gaining ground.  The improved situation of the privatized
provincial banks is also reflected in their portfolio quality.  Their percentage of bad credits is
lower than for public provincial banks.  These improvements in portfolio quality, moreover, have
coincided with a decreased emphasis on public credit.  All of this augers well for the future
solvency of these banks.  More importantly, perhaps, the data suggest that credit allocation is
improving as a result of privatization.  Although the social welfare effects of improved credit
allocation are difficult to quantify, these may be privatization's  most important legacy.
V  CONCLUSIONS
The evidence from Argentina strongly suggests that, from a fiscal perspective, the
decision to maintain a public provincial bank is a costly one.  Loss rates for public provincial
banks in Argentina were much higher than for other banks, implying that the future fiscal costs
24of maintaining the solvency and liquidity of these institutions are hiigh. Although privatization
might appear unappealing to policy makers with short time horizons, the long-term fiscal gains
demonstrate the importance of privatization.  Courageous policy makers should root out the
problems caused by public provincial banks that misallocate credit and are frequently in need of
re-capitalization.  Although the short time series makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions,
the data currently available indicate that privatization enhances future solvency prospects.
No doubt, the regulatory environment into which these banks were sold also affects their
solvency.  To the extent that sound, incentive compatible prudential regulations are in place at
the time of privatization (and, in Argentina's  case that appears to be true), the future
performance of all banks is likely to be improved. The results, hiowever,  suggest that improved
regulation and supervision does not deliver the same benefits as improved regulation and
supervision combined with privatization -- the provincial banks that remained in the public
sector did not demonstrate the same performance gains as privatized provinicial  banks.
This paper also has some important findings of special interest to policymakers in
Argentina, and in other,countries considering privatizing state-owned banks.  Based on the
Argentinean experience, policy makers should expect the privatization to pass through some, or
all, of the following steps.  First, with respect to pre-privatization audits, expect losses hidden in
these banks to be larger than indicated in prior audits.  Second, if residual entities are created,
expect them to comprise a large share of the assets and liabilities of the old public provincial
bank if the quality of its loan portfolio was low. Third, based on the experience to date, do not
expect the price paid for the privatized entity (the so-called "good bank") to be large, at least in
comparison with the assets and liabilities in the residual entity.  Fourth, if the residual entity is
large, the province will be confronted with substantial short-term liabilities.  With assistance
(e.g. from Fondo Fiduciario loans in Argentina) and an aggressive asset recovery strategy,
25however, governments should be able to navigate their way through short-term difficulty.  It will
take a significant amount of time to tell whether residual entity liquidations are proceeding well
and, therefore, further analysis in this area is warranted as data becomes available.  Finally,
policy makers that make (or have made) the tough decision to privatize should take heart that the
data strongly indicate that the costs of privatization are smaller than the costs of future re-
capitalization, even if the near-term management of the residual entity does not go well.
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29APPENDIX  1
Fiscal Costs of Re-Capitalization  Under Various Scenarios
Scenario  1:  Ratio of Net Worth to Assets in Year 1: .115  (Arg. Requirement)
Net Worth in Year 1: 25,000,000
Loss Rate in Ratio of Net Worth to Liabilities:  .090 (Sample Mean, Prov)
Rate of Growth in Nominal Liabilities: .1  13 (Sample Mean, 1996)
Year  Net Worth  Total  Total  Implied  Nominal  PV  PV
Assets  Liabil.  Asset  Re-Cap.  Re-Cap.  Re-Cap.
Growth  Payment  Payment  Payment
During  10% disc  15% disc
millions  millions  millions  Cycle  millions  millions  millions
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
1  25  217  192  .020  0  0  0
3  -11.9  226  238  .020  42.9  29.3  24.5
6  -14.8  280  295  .020  53.1  27.2  20.0
9  -18.3  347  366  .020  65.8  25.3  16.3
12  -22.6  430  453  .020  81.5  23.6  13.2
96  -9092.0  172747  181839  .020  32731.0  3.2  .04
99  -11262.8  213994  225257  .020  35881.6  2.6  .03
Total  205515  383  132
Scenario 2:  Same as 1, except Loss Rate in Ratio of Net Worth to Total Liabilities is .08 (Sample Mean
for Public provincial banks except Buenos Aires, excluding the years with the highest and the lowest loss
rates)  l
99  -6765.7  225257  218491  .031  31901.8  2.3  .03
Total  182721  340  117
Scenario3:  Same as 1, except Loss Rate in Ratio of Net  Worth to Total Liabilities is .0627 (Sample Mean
for Public provincial banks except Buenos Aires, excluding year with highest average loss rates)
99  994.7  225257  226251  .049  25034.2  1.8  .021
Total  l  143386  267  92
Scenario 4:  Same as 1,  except Loss Rate in Ratio of Net Worth to Total Liabilities is . 125
99  -27031  198226  225257  -.018  49835  3.6  .04
Total  |  l  [  _  |  285438  531  183
30APPENDIX  II. THE LOSS  OF NET  WORTH  AMONG PUBLIC PROVINCIAL BANKS.
Between  1991 and 1996, the net worth of most public provincial banks declined in both
nominal and real terms (See Table  1  1). These small nominal drops in net worth coincided with
large declines in the ratio of net worth to total liabilities (NW/TL), due to large increases in the
nominal value of liabilities.  The average net worth of private banks, Buenos Aires, and those
privatized provincial banks that had already gone through their pre-privatization audits grew in
nominal terms (Table 11 and Figure 1).  36  Although this was a roughi  period for al I banks --
private banks' average NW/TL fell by 3.7% -- the  9% average decline for public provincial
banks was over twice as large (See Table 11 and Figure 3).37
Thle  large drops in NW/TL were partly due to severe financial disintermediation (low
liability levels) early in the period.  In 1991, inflation was 172% and, as a result, the ratio of M2
to GDP dipped to 10.6%. The ratio of quasi-money (timie,  savings, and foreign currency
deposits) to GDP was only 4.2%, low even by developing country standards.  As inflation
subsided (24.6% in 1992 and 10.6% in 1993), financial depth recovered (quasi-money was 8.7%
of GDP in 1992 and 11.7% in 1993) and NW/TL dropped as bank liabilities increased. However,
even excluding the dramatic drop in 1991, the average annual loss in NW/TL was 6.3% for
public provincial banks.38
"Private banks" refers to a sample of the ten largest private banks in Argentina as of 1996.  It was thought that
these ten would be among the best performing banks in Argentina, and thus would provide a difficult comparitor
for the privatized bank sample.  In this way, we biased our analysis against the conclusion that newly privatized
banks were performing well solely because they had improved relative to public provincial banks.
Encouragingly, in the comparisons that follow, the privatized provincial banks tend to perform nearly as well as
these large private banks.
As noted earlier, Buenos Aires appears very different from the other public provincial banks.  Therefore, results
excluding Buenos Aires are presented in addition to results including Buenos Aires.
Comparisons between privatized and private banks in Table II may be misleading in that almost ali
privatizations occurred late in the period.  To the extent that banking conditions were more tfvorable in these
years, privatized provincial banks'  relatively impressive performance with respect to net worth and NW/TL may
be illusory. Of course, the Tequila Crisis years occurred late in the period, which makes it unlikely that the
privatized provincial banks' performance benefited from timing etfects.  Clarke and Cull (1 997b) offers the same
comparisons between banks as in Table I1, except that they are broken down by year for the period 1994-6,  the
prime privatization years.  The qualitative results remain largely unchanged.
31Table 11: Net Worth/Assets by Type of Bank (1991-96)39
Bank Type  Mean  Std. Dev.  Max.  Min.  Observ.
Net Worth
Provincial  87,476.8  208,054.1  1,282,039  -32,307  135
Prov - BA  44,622.4  47,491.6  227,959  -32,307  129
Private  221,535.6  168,059.1  687,052  9,478  70
Privatized Prov
Last Year Public  -16,938.7  53,275.7  58,352  -133,079  13
1st Year Private  17,896.8  11,441.0  37,403  4,500  6
2nd Year Private  28,041.0  16,448.6  45,852  13,423  3
Change in Net
Worth
Provincial  2,959.7  37,037.0  194,707  -128,424  109
Prov - BA  -1,890.6  25,824.9  65,012  -128,424  104
Private  36,854.4  47,189.8  232,437  -93,911  60
Privatized Prov
Last Year Public  -50,778.8  64,395.5  14,240  -186,965  13
1st Year Private  46,818.8  73,145.3  146,231  -34,214  6
2nd Year Private  6,027.3  4,611.0  8,923  710  3
Chng in NW/TL
Provincial  -0.086  0.217  0.170  -1.523  106
Prov - BA  -0.090  0.222  0.170  -1.523  101
Private  -0.037  0.066  0.138  -0.307  58
Privatized Prov
Last Year Public  -0.150  0.208  0.054  -0.665  13
Ist Year Private  +0.210  0.265  0.584  -0.052  5
2nd Year Private  +0.005  0.045  0.053  -0.035  3
% Clhg in Assets
Provincial  +26.7  39.1  215.5  -50.6  108
Prov - BA  +27.6  39.8  215.5  -50.6  103
Private  +43.9  36.1  174.3  -27.1  58
Privatized Prov
Last Year Public  -8.1  37.7  66.8  -76.8  13
I st Year Private  -13.1  64.6  80.8  -69.2  5
2nd Year Private  +68.6  75.8  156.1  23.4  3
The performance  of privatized  provincial  banks  with respect  to net worth  and  NW/TL
depended  on how  far the  bank  was along  the privatization  process.  In the year  prior to the  actual
" Notes: Provincial  covers  all public  provincial  banks,  including  those  observations  for privatized  provincial  banks
prior to privatization.  As noted  below,  qualitative  results  for provincial  banks  are quite  similar  if these  pre-
privatization  observations  are dropped. Prov - BA is Provincial  except  for  observations  for Buenos  Aires.  Private
covers a sample often  large private banks.  For privatized provincial banks, the data are broken into three categories.
The first is all observations from privatized banks when they were in their final year as a public bank (when more
rigorous audits occurred).  The second, "I st year private," contains observations for all privatized banks during their
first full year of private operations.  "2nd year private" contains observations from their second years of private
operation.
32sale (the last year of public management), when rigorous pre-privatization audits typically
occurred, net worth plummeted, usually dipping well below zero.  In the first fuill  year of private
nanagement,  net worth recovered, normally becoming positive.  On average, the gains in net
worth, when coupled with the reduced liabilities of the privatized provincial bank, were more
thaii sufficient to offset the decline in NW/TL during the last year of public operation.  The
improvements left the average privatized provincial bank with a marginally acceptable NW/TL
ratio (9.8%) that was often sustained throughout the second year of private operation (See Figure
4 throughi Figure 6 for examples).
Figure I
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4,000,000  - -
~3,500,000
S  2,500,000  ..  F_rw-iv-a-te  Banks 3 ,000,000  rvMnsBeo
2 ,500,0007
Yea  2  by000  yea  coprsn  ewe  ulcadprivatizing  prvncaabnsnrkdficl
*~1000,000
du  oa  akofdt.Norlabecmprsn  can Pro  mnus buenore19:olsCrine  a
z
500,000  A
0  ~~Prov  Buenos  A.
1990  1992  1994  1996
Year
Year by year comparisons between public and privatized provinicial  baniks  are difficult
due to a lack of data. No reliable comparisons can be made before 1993: onily  Corrientes hiad
40
been privatized, and it was still not far along the post-privatization path.  Between 1994 and
1996 there were typically provinces in the first, second and third years of privatization.  The
number of observations in each group were, however, quite small (less than four).  With few
exceptions, banks in their first and second full years of private operation out-performed  all other
40  It should also be noted that Corrientes eventually went back to public hands.  At present, the province has begun
searching for a new private owner.  Clearly, the Corrientes experience should be seen as distinct from the others.
33banks.41 Privatized banks in their first year of private operations typically experienced dramatic
post-audit increases in both net worth and NW/TL which were, no doubt, largely due to the
provinces'  efforts to create salable banks from the post-audit ruins.  The dramatic increases are
not, therefore, an indication that old public provincial bank operations had necessarily improved,
but rather that tihe  difficulties resulting from years of sub-par operations had been swept into the
residual entities.
Figure 2
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Notes: Figure 2 is a re-production of  Figure 1,  except that private banks are eliminated to foster  better visual
comparisons.
Figure 3
Ratio of Net Worth to Total  Liabilities
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Notes:  Private includes the ten large banks in the private b-anking  sampie.  Privatizing includes those had privatized by
1996, and five banks who were in the early stages of privatization in 1996, but had not as yet sold their banks. Prov
41  See Clarke and Cull (1997b) for details.
34BA is Buenos Aires.  Prov w/o BA is for all public provincial banks except Buenos Aires.  Prov w/o BA, COR is for
all public provincial banks except Buenos Aires and the Banco de La Provincia de Cordoba.  Figure 3 presents data for
only 1992-96 to foster better visual comparisons.  As noted in the text,  1991 was a year of severe financial
disintermediation.  The result was a very high ratio of net worth to liabilities, which declined dramatically in 1992 as
disintermediation subsided.  The 1993-96 data probably give the most accurate depiction of the steady-state situation.
Figure 4
Entre  Rios: Ratio  of Net  Worth  to Liabilities
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Figure  4, Figure  5 and  Figure  6 show that  the privatization  cycle  -- dramatic  declines  in
NW/TL  in the  last year  of public  operations,  and  a recovery  in the  first  year  of private  operations
that  is maintained  in the  second  year -- is evident  regardless  of banking  conditions  in a given
year.  Entre  Rios, Formosa,  and  San Luis all experienced  dramatic  declines  in NW/TL  in their
last years  as public  banks  (respectively  1994,  1995,  and  1996).  Both  Enitre Rios  and  Formosa
35recovered to NW/TL levels just under .10 (in line with the Basle guidelines for capital
adequacy).  As noted, Entre Rios maintained these levels in its second full year of private
operation.  It remains to be seen whether Formosa will do the same in 1997, and whether San
Luis will recover and then maintain in 1997 and 1998.
Figure 6
San Luis:  Ratio  of Net  Worth  to Liabilities
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In summary, a province contemplating privatization should expect a rigorous pre-
privatization audit to greatly decrease the public provincial bank's apparent NW/TL.  Potential
privatizers should, however, be assured that in every case to date provinces have created a
salable entity from the ashes of the public provincial bank. After privatization, moreover, these
new banks appear to function on par with well-established private banks (at least with respect to
NW/TL).  As demonstrated in Section II, the decreased risk of government re-capitalization will
more than compensate the province for the short-term fiscal pain caused by realizing existing
losses.
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